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4ABSTRACT
Institutional regulations by way of licensing and capacity
restrictions have often been considered as barriers to competition in
Indian industry.  As most of these regulations have given way for market
signals an increase in the number of entrants and alterations in the
conditions of entry, mainly the barriers to entry are expected.  In this
paper I attempt to analyse the extent of barriers to entry in Indian
manufacturing by empirically quantifying the height of these barriers.
Econometric estimation of the height of the barriers for 1991 and 1996
shows that the height of barriers increased in 1996 at the aggregate
level.  An examination at the disaggregate level reveals that in almost
all the industries examined from a sample of firms drawn from the CMIE
the height of the barriers have increased in 1996 compared to 1991.  The
dilution and dismantling of commands and controls intended to ease
entry have thus paved the way for the erection and strengthening of
market barriers which have grown over time.
JEL Classification : L1, L11, L13
Key words : economic reforms, entry barriers, height of barriers,
market barriers
5Introduction
As spelt out in the industrial policy statements one of the major
components of the economic reforms package in India has been the
deregulation and delicensing in the manufacturing sector. The rationale
provided often hinges on the argument of inducing competition, which
in turn is expected to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of the
manufacturing sector. Lack of competition due to entry restrictions also
paves the way for the existence of market power resulting in welfare
loss. Institutional regulations by way of licensing and capacity
restrictions are often considered as barriers to competition in Indian
industry. As most of these regulations have given way for market signals
an increase in the number of entrants and alterations in the conditions of
entry, mainly the barriers to entry are expected.  In this paper I attempt to
analyse the extent of barriers to entry in Indian manufacturing by
empirically quantifying the height of these barriers. The analysis is
carried out for two time points in accordance with the launching of
economic reforms to delineate the possible impact of changes in the
policy regime.
I confine to some of the measurement issues of entry barriers. The
method followed, on the lines of Geroski (1991), can be described as
'consilience of induction', an attempt to weave together wide range of
6disparate results from different sources1 . This is done due to the lack of
unanimity regarding the measurement of entry and its barriers, as these
are the outcome of a complex process of strategic interaction among
firms.
Entry: its importance and actual practice
Entry is often considered as an 'error correction mechanism' to
keep markets in (or near) equilibrium. Thus even the threat of entry is
considered as an effective source of market discipline. This
characterization has led to the development of models of strategic entry
deterrence on lines of a contest between 'insiders and outsiders'. It is this
element of market discipline due to entry that has been emphasized in
its portrayal as a selection process in which market chooses between
established and entrant firms as well as between different types of entrants.
Entry of new competitors is generally viewed to have beneficial effects.
It is considered as a source of competitive discipline bidding prices
down thus eliminating excess profits. Entry also changes the structure
of the market and can upset the traditional patterns of market conduct.
Quite often new entrants de-throne dominant firms, introduce new
technology and fresh approaches to product design and marketing
leading to more competitive prices. Viewed from this perspective entry
reduces x-inefficiency and stimulates innovation and technical
progressivity2 . However, in actual practice the situation might be
different.
There exists considerable controversy on the impact of entry. Direct
entry is considered to have a small effect. Biggadike (1976) examined
40 entry attempts by 20 large US firms and observed that less than 40per
1 See Gould 1989, p.282.
2 See Geroski (1991).
7cent of these entrants achieved a penetration of at least 10per cent within
two years. Masson and Shaanan (1982) found that over the period 1950-
66 for 37 US industries the average market share penetration by entrants
was 4.5per cent over 6-8 years implying a gain of less than 1per cent per
year while, Yip (1982) for 59 entrants found a median gain of 6per cent,
with entry via acquisition achieving a penetration roughly 3 times that
achieved by direct entrants.  Hause and DE Reitz (1984) investigated
entry in Sweden over 15-year period and found that the new entrants
only managed 1.7per cent market penetration on average that period.
This international evidence point to the fact that, in reality the impact
of new entrant by penetrating into the market seems to be little.
Even though, the entrants manage only modest market penetration
the actual number of entrants are very large.  Dunne and Roberts (1986)
examined about 400 four-digit industries in US for 1967, 72, 77 and 82
and observed 285, 347, 418 and 425 entrants on average per industry
respectively. Interestingly, there exist a close relationship between entry
and exit. Geroski (1988) found that on an average 130 firms exited per
industry in UK during early eighties. So there could be situations in
which entry appears to be easy, but post-entry market penetration and
survival seems to be difficult. An explanation offered for this
phenomenon is in terms of the existence of high barriers to entry.
What are mobility barriers?3
As a prelude to the analysis a precise definition of mobility barriers
is warranted. One of the well-known definitions is that of Bain (1956).
Bain argues that barriers to new competition depends on the condition
3 Following Caves and Porter (1977) we depart from the early literature on
barriers which focussed on impediments to the entry of new capital into the
market and adopt a more general perspective arguing that hindrances exist
even for the movement of resources into, out of, or within an existing
industry. This leads us to use the term mobility barriers.
8of entry which is "determined by the advantages of established sellers in
an industry over potential entrant sellers"'4 . According to him a barrier
to entry exists if the new entrant is unable to achieve the profit levels
after entry that the incumbent enjoyed prior to its arrival. To Elaborate,
let pii(xi*,....,xn*) be incumbent i's profit in a situation where incumbent
firms  i = 1,....,n  operate at the pre-entry outputs xi*, and let
Π
e
(xi**,....,xn**,xe**) be the profit of an entrant at post entry output
xi** and xe**. Entry is deterred if Πe < 0.  According to Bain the height
of barriers to entry for this industry is measured as Πi - max[Πe,0], that is,
the level of profits that can be sustained against entry in perpetuity.
Condition of entry is primarily a structural situation according to Bain,
"which describes the circumstances in which the potentiality of
competition will or will not become actual"5.
Stigler's (1968) definition broadly termed as the Chicago School's
definition defines a barrier to entry "as a cost of producing (at some or
every rate of output) which must be borne by firms which seek to enter
an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry"6 . According
to Stigler a barrier to entry would exist if the new firm has to overcome
more consumer resistance than did the established firm and the height
of an entry barrier would be the additional cost an entrant would have to
bear in order to produce the same revenue as an established firm. Stigler
considers an entry barrier to exist only if the conditions of entry were
less difficult for established firms than for new entrants.  Stigler compares
the entrant and incumbent post entry, that is, a barrier exists if the two
are not equally efficient after the costs of entering the industry are taken
into account. While Bain's emphasis is on the conditions of entry that
4 Bain, (1956, P.3)
5 Bain, (1956, pp.17-18).
6 Stigler (1968, p.67).
9permit an established firm to raise price above the minimum average
cost of the potential entrants.
The definitions of Bain and Stigler are considered as positive
definitions of barriers and do not address the welfare consequences of
entry. The emphasis is more on the characterization of the conditions
that impede entry. Weizsacker (1980) provides what is termed as a
'normative definition' of the barriers to entry which is a qualification of
the definition proposed by Stigler. He defines barriers to entry as a "cost
of producing (at some or every rate of output) which must be borne by
firms which seek to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in
the industry, and which implies a distortion in the use of economic
resource from the social point of view"7  . Demsetz (1982) further extends
this approach, by supporting an efficient allocation of resources, argues
that, in many cases, what is called an entry barrier is an endogenous
response to consumer preferences. The major strength as well as the
weakness of this approach is its explicit focus on the normative
consequences of entry. So a comprehensive way to asses entry would be
to add normative complexities to the measures of barriers to entry defined
by Stigler and Bain. Thus the ideal way to evaluate barriers is in two
explicit steps : first, measure their height, and then, evaluate their
consequences for welfare.
According to Gilbert (1989) mobility barriers exists if a firm earns
rents as a consequence of incumbency. This approach has no relation to
the consequence of entry or exit for economic welfare and concentrates
solely on the advantages that accrue to established firm with emphasis
on the role of history and how that affects relative profits. An exit barrier
exists if an incumbent firm could earn more if it could leave the industry
7 Weizsacker, (1980, p.400).
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and an entry barrier exists if a firm earns a premium by virtue of its being
established in the industry.
The above views on what forms an entry barrier points to the
considerable controversy over its definition and how it could be
measured. These differences can be resolved if one can show how the
factors affecting entry depend critically on the behaviour of the
incumbent firms even without attempting to perform a welfare analysis
of the barriers. Thus the determinants of entry become crucial to
understand the extent of barriers and their consequences.
Factors affecting the conditions of entry
A barrier, which gives major advantages for the incumbents, is the
realization of the economies of scale. Scale economies act as a barrier
for the entrants in two ways, via, a 'percentage effect' and an 'absolute
capital requirement effect'8 . The 'percentage effect' depends on the size
of the minimum efficient scale plant relative to the extent of the market.
This occurs for large minimum efficient plants (MEP) and if the entrant
is to enter at efficient scale, the '...addition to going industry output....
will result in a reduction of industry selling prices'9 . The entrant will
face a cost penalty depending on the slope of the cost curve at sub MEP
scales if entry occurs at less than efficient scale. Implicit in the above is
the prescription that incumbent firms will not accommodate entry by
scaling back their own production by an amount equal to the production
offered by new entrants. The expectation of the potential entrants
regarding the actions of the incumbents to hold on to their market share
turns out to be the key issue here.
8 Bain (1956, p.55).
9 Bain (1956 p.53).
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Absolute capital requirements effect arises from the large
investment outlays necessary to build an appropriate sized plant. The
size of the disadvantage so created depends on the absolute size of
MEP. The imperfections in capital markets, which affect the availability
of finances for investments, add to the disadvantage of the entrants. The
magnitude of this barrier increases as new entrants often encounter
difficulties in raising capital, locating and training a qualified work
force and developing the inventories and distribution channels needed
for entry at MES as all these induces differential cost effects which are
substantial.
Even though at the conceptual level the manifestation of scale
economies as a barrier is unambiguous, at an empirical plane the
estimation is often confronted with difficulties. The pre requisite for the
estimation of scale-related entry barriers is the generation of estimates
of the cost per unit that could be achieved at different output levels by
the most advantages entrant. The most advantaged entrant is usually
defined as the one using the best possible organization of production
currently available and minimizing factor expenditures. It needs no
mention that the so called  ' best possible' is often difficult to observe
and what can be easily be observed are the actual unit costs of incumbent
firms. So inferences on 'what ought to be' can be made only from what is
observed with the assumption that at the best an entrant can only replicate
the actions of one or more existing firm which is efficient. The other
alternative is direct measurement of MEP. Here one works out from the
basic engineering principles what would be the optimal plant size, given
current technology, factor prices and so on, for an entrant to aspire to
and how large the various cost penalties associated with the non optimal
scale are.
Dixit (1981) discusses the use of investment as an entry barrier.
This materializes when capital expenditures once made, become
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irreversible or 'sunk' in the next period. Then an established firm might
be able to commit to producing an output that it could not sustain at
equilibrium if its first period expenditure were irreversible. Sunk
expenditure lowers the incumbent's marginal cost for any output below
the full capacity level, which, in turn discourages the firm from cutting
output in response to entry. Dixit also shows that potential entry may
encourage an incumbent firm to invest more in irreversible capital which
has the effect of increasing the incumbent's post entry equilibrium output,
while lowering the entrant's post entry equilibrium output and price.
Sunk costs are a barrier that permits the incumbents to act strategically
and forces the entrant to operate at a large scale in order to make profits.
Capital investment can be an effective entry deterrent in the above
model even if the potential entrant has the same cost function as the
incumbent or even if the entrant has lower cost. This is because the
extent to which costs are sunk plays an important strategic role in
permitting the established firm to commit to a level of output that it
would maintain if entry were to occur. The established firm's technology
with its sunk capital cost is a mechanism by which the firm can sustain
the aggressive market share. The Dixit model is thus a theoretical
construction that supports Bain's structural view of economies of scale
as a barrier to entry and contradicts Stigler's definition of a barrier to
entry, which relies on symmetries in the pre-entry costs of established
and new firms. The fact is that entry prevention can be achieved in the
Dixit model even if the entrant and established firms share the same
technology.
Another set of advantages for the incumbents arise from absolute
cost advantages. These exist for the incumbent firm" ...if the prospective
unit costs of production of potential entrant firms are generally, and
more or less at any scale of operations, higher than those of the established
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firms....."10  . Bain defined the absence of absolute cost advantages of an
established firm by the following conditions " ...for a given product,
potential entrant firms should be able to secure just as low a minimal
average cost of production after entry as established firm had prior to
this entry. This in turn implies that (a) established firms should have no
price or other advantages over entrants in purchasing or securing any
productive factor including investible funds, (b) the entry of an added
firm should have no perceptible effect on the going level of any factor
price; and (c) established firms have no preferred access to productive
techniques "11.
Not all apparent cost advantages qualify as entry barriers. An
advantage relative to less efficient potential entrants that is common
knowledge to all might not constitute a barrier to entry. Absolute cost
disadvantages thus refer to at base, to some factor of production that is
denied to the potential entrant, who but for this omitted factor would
have been as efficient as established firms. A typical example for this is
access to natural resources or key patents12. Much of the empirical
literature is not concerned with whether absolute cost advantages are
truly barriers or not but have focused as to whether they allow incumbent
firms to earn super-normal profits. This depends on whether the assets,
which are the source of these cost advantages, are carried on the
accounting books at their historical costs or at their market values13.
Thus whether or not absolute cost advantages allow firms to earn
persistent above normal profits will depend on, at least in part, in the
accounting practices of those firms.
10 Bain (1956, p.144).
11 Bain (1956, p.12).
12 Bain and Mann discusses the first in detail and Demsetz (1982) discusses the
later.
13 For a discussion of this in relation to the use of accounting profits to infer
the existence of such barriers see Edwards et.al (1987)
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Relying on strategies focusing on product differentiation and
advertising incumbents erect important set of barriers. Barriers created
by product differentiation refer to " ... buyers' preferences for one of the
same variety of very similar substitute products ... and also to the fact
that different buyers have different product allegiances or preference
patterns so that the preferences in question do not result in some
universally agreed upon system of grading or rating of the competing
products" and such effects can be propagated by differences in design,
quality or sales promotion with the effect that each "... individual seller
gains some jurisdiction over his price"14. It is unlikely that entrants will
be able to reap post entry the price and price-cost margins enjoyed by
the incumbents with out expending resources to develop their own
consumer loyalties, as there exist a preference for established products.
Thus the late coming entrants are forced to incur costs in their efforts to
achieve market penetration.
The entrants will have to persuade consumers already settled in
their ways to collect information, compare products with different
specifications and then re-evaluate their purchasing habits and the
incumbent might avoid such costs because it was first on to the market.
Farrell (1986) provides evidence to show that new entrants may have a
tougher time convincing customers that they will deliver comparable
quality. The empirical method to identify the source of product
differentiation advantages examines the experience of pioneering brands
in markets that experience subsequent entry. Urban et al (1984) examined
129 frequently purchased consumer brands in 12 US markets and related
the share of the nth mover relative to first movers to the order of entry,
entry lags, relative advertising and brand positioning. The order of entry
was positively correlated with relative shares. The second brand in the
14 Bain (1956, p.114)
15
market had a share less than 75per cent of the pioneer on average, the
3rd about 60per cent, 4th 50per cent and so on all for the same given
levels of advertising. Numerous case studies also suggest that early
movers are able to sustain their market position against later entrants15.
As advertising is often identified as the principal cause of product
differentiation barriers, attempts to measure product differentiation
barriers often equate barriers due to product differentiation with that of
advertising. Comanor and Wilson are the most prominent advocates of
this approach. According to them advertising expenditures " are both a
symptom and a source of differentiation"16 . They identified absolute
cost, economies of scale and capital requirements as sources of entry
barriers due to advertising. At the empirical level they used advertising-
sale ratio to measure absolute cost advantages and advertising per firm
to pick up economies of scale and capital requirements effects. The
finding of positive correlation between advertising and profitability
has been replicated in many other studies and has been interpreted as
establishing the importance of this source of barrier.
Advertising is just not a structural characteristic of the market, so
equating product differentiation with advertising and to think that
advertising expenditures may measure the height of barriers associated
with product differentiation could be unreasonable.  Advertising is one
of the methods by which incumbents compete against each other. The
source of product differentiation barrier lies in the basic structural
determinants of the choice of advertising levels such as consumer
preferences, consumer informativeness and the technology of production
and of information transmission.
15 Geroski et al., (1990)  provides a review of some of these studies.
16 Comanor and Wi1son (1967, p.473).
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It emerges that there are a wide range of factors, which can serve as
barriers to entry, although, the various structural factors do not always
necessarily give rise to barriers. However much depend on the way that
the barriers have been measured in practice.  Most of the empirical work
have tried to follow Bain's painstaking measurement exercise which in
practice has often amounted to comparing actually observed entrants
with incumbents, or has involved simple counter-factual constructions
based on observations of incumbent's activities. This creates an upward
bias in measuring barriers as there is the implicit or explicit use of
incumbent's current activities as the ' best possible under circumstances',
which ignores the opportunity that entrants may have to do better than
incumbents. This is more pronounced in the case of product
differentiation as the definition of a product is very elastic and there
exists the possibility that subtle changes in the product can successfully
engineer a leap into the markets.
Thus the issue boils down to the interpretation of the evidence. It
is ubiquitous that the various structural conditions can give rise to
barriers but one always runs the risk of overstating its importance. Apart
from the measurement problems the extent to which structural factors
are strategically exploited by the incumbents to deter entry is also
important. Scale economies per se might not block entry, unless it is
accompanied by the threat of large price cuts attendant upon attempted
entry at MEP scale. Similarly, in the case of advertising the issue is the
cost of advertising and the calculations based on the advertising response
of incumbents. Thus one ought to explore the incidence of various
types of strategic entry behaviour in evaluating the various structural
determinants of entry.
Discussions in the Indian context
As we know for many years firms trying to enter an industry had to
clear the hurdle of getting permission from the government in the form
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of licenses. These licensing requirements created effective entry barriers
in many markets and assured the sheltered life of those firms that managed
to get licenses. However, after the abolition of licensing, except for a
few industries, it has become imperative for firms to formulate entry
strategies based on more market-oriented considerations.
There have been some studies on the barriers to entry in Indian
manufacturing. Some of recent ones are examined here. Mani (1992)
discusses the issue of barriers to entry in light of the industrial policy
statement of 1991. According to him the dismantling of the capacity
restrictions through licensing in many industries intended to reduce the
height of barriers to entry might not work favourably as the earlier
policy of fixing minimum efficient scales of operation (MES 1985-86)
has erected capital barriers to entry. Citing tyre industry as an example
he argues that the capital barriers to entry by MES is very high. However,
empirical examination of the height of the barriers is not attempted.
Siddarthan and Pandit (1992) examines the impact the policy
changes introduced in 1985 on the structure conduct and performance
of the manufacturing sector. Using stepwise discriminant analysis they
scanned for the variables that acted as principle discriminant for the
period pre and post 1985. They found labour productivity, size of units,
skill and import intensity, rate of entry, rate of investments, growth of
output and borrowings as statistically significant indicating a positive
impact of the liberalisation package. However, the study fails to take
into account the further doses of policy changes.
Emphasising more on the welfare issues in the event of entry by
foreign firms, Jenson and Krishna (1996) examine entry policy in an
open economy. They demonstrate that allowing foreign firms in the
industry can directly alter the direction of entry bias by shifting profits
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away from the home country. According to them, as the number of firms
were kept low in India by licensing, liberalizing entry was likely to be
beneficial to begin with. However citing the example of Australia which
experimented liberal entry but restrictive trade policy prior to the '80s
they sound a word of caution that the industry could experience a
dissipation in profits and high prices due to large fixed costs and small
production runs. This study also does not address the measurement
issues of barriers to entry.
Using CMIE firm level data for 31 industries for a period of 1989-
93, Saikia (1997) tries to explain the process of entry in Indian
manufacturing. Specifying a model of entry on lines of Orr (1974) he
estimates entry as a function of past industry profit rate, sunk costs
measured by machinery intensity, product differentiation proxied by
intensity of advertising, industry size, concentration, growth and risk.
He finds that entry is positively associated with market size and growth
and deterred in a concentrated market. After adjusting for simultaneity
problem he finds profits to be one of the significant determinants of
entry. The sunk cost variable turns out to be insignificant along with
product differentiation, which he attributes to small sample size.  The
height of barriers to entry does not find a place in his empirical analysis
as well.
Four types of entry (1) setting up of a new firm in the industry (2)
buying i.e., purchasing an existing firm (through mergers, amalgamation
or friendly takeover) (3) acquire control through hostile takeovers and
(4) enter via joint venture route are surveyed in Sen (1997). The strategies
are identified using game theoretic frame work of Tirole and Fudenberg
(1991).  However he does not present any empirical evidence from the
Indian context.
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Studies in the Indian context, eventhough have discussed the
various entry strategies and barriers, have omitted empirical
quantification of these barriers. The present study, for the first time,
addresses this issue in light of the policy changes. I start with the
specification of a model to capture the height of these barriers.
Measuring the height of overall barriers to entry
As is clear from the theoretical literature, incumbent firms use a
variety of barriers to thwart competition in order to enhance and sustain
their profits. These barriers are used individually and in combination
but in most of the cases derive strength from interactive effects. To
elaborate, even modest advertising can be effective in the presence of a
vigorous after sales service. True is the case with scale economies as it
helps to reap benefits from absolute cost advantages as well, and a
combination of advertising and product differentiation proves to be
more effective than focusing on product differentiation alone.  The
point to be stressed is that it is misleading to consider the effects of these
various barriers separately as there exists the possibilities of synergies
arising out of the joint effect of all the types of barriers taken together.
This prompts an examination of the overall barriers.
Inferences on the magnitude of the overall barriers are drawn by
computing the height of barriers. We compute the height of the overall
barriers at the aggregate and disaggregate level to discern the extent of
barriers and its changes over time. In order to measure the height of
overall barriers two approaches are followed in the literature17 .  First, is
the method followed by Bain, which relies on the judgement of the
researcher to convert the ranking of industries by each source of barrier
17 A third method followed in our disaggregate analysis is that of Geroski
(1991). This as elaborated in the subsequent section is a further modification
of the second approach.
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into a discontinuous overall scale.  This of course involves an element
of subjectivity, which could influence the results.  The second approach
put forth by Orr (1974), which is used here is free from this bias.
Most of the econometric investigations of entry barriers have been
indirect tests. They have regressed profit rates, rather than entry, on
those structural characteristics considered to be barriers to entry,
Unfortunately this specification does not permit reliable conclusions
regarding the effectiveness of those variables in deterring entry. There
are theoretical reasons for questioning the often-assumed strong positive
relationship between entry barriers and the true profit rate. Additionally
of course there is a gap between true and measured profits.
Attempts to model entry began only after the work of Dale Orr in
1974. In his pioneering work Orr put forth a model of entry, which draws
parallels from the work of Bain (1949) and Sylos (1958) on limit pricing
which describe entry-limiting price as the maximum to which price can
be raised above the competitive level with out attracting entry. This
forms the starting point for Orr. According to him the price-cost margin
determined by the limit price implies a certain rate of return on sales,
which is directly related to the rate of return on capital for the firms of
particular industry where the best practice technology requires a specific
capital output ratio. Entry limit price thus implies an entry limit profit
rate on capital and in the absence of entry barriers entry will take place
till the marginal rates of return on capital across industries becomes
equal. The incumbent firms, which attempt to block the entry, will raise
the profits until the expected post entry profit rates of an entrant equals
the entrant's opportunity cost of capital. Thus entry continues until the
industry profit rate reaches a point where the entrant's expected rate of
return on capital is equal to the opportunity cost of capital.  It can thus
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be noticed that entry will be a positive function of the difference between
observed and entry limiting profit rates and in rapidly growing industries
entry limiting strategies are more difficult providing more opportunities
to enter.  So we expect entry to be a positive function of the expected
rate of growth of industry output.
From the above theoretical basis Orr (1974)18  formulates a general
model which is specified below and arrive at the magnitude of entry
barriers by constructing an index of overall level of entry barriers.
E = ß0 eß1 (pip -pi*) eß 2Q. Sß3 µ (1)
Where,
pi* = f (K,A,R,r,C) (2)
And,
 E = the rate of entry,
 pip = past rate of profit,
 Q.  = past rate of growth of industry output,
 K = capital requirements,
 A = advertising intensity,
 R = research and development intensity,
 r= risk , the standard deviation of industry profit rates,
 C = concentration,
 S = industry size (industry sales).
Entry is specified, as a function of the gap between the observed
profit rate and some entry limiting profit rate, observed growth of the
industry output and industry size.  pip captures the extent of economic
rents enjoyed by the incumbent firms, which is the incentive for new
18 There has been several studies which have followed the basic methodology
of Orr. Gorecki (1975,1976), Hamilton (1985), MacDonald (1986), Mason
and Shanan(1986), Schwalbach (1987) and Shapiro(1983) are among these.
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firms to enter as their expectations are based on this. Another incentive
is the rate of growth of industry output as the expectations are based on
past growth. This variable in effect supplements the first variable, as the
growth of the industry is an incentive to enter and provides opportunities
for enhancing profitability. Capital requirement is well known as a major
entry barrier19  and is defined as the cost of fixed capital required to
establish a plant of minimally effective size.  The variable on advertising
intensity is intended to capture the barriers erected through advertising20
as well as the effect of product differentiation21  as firms use advertising
as a method of product differentiation. Research and development acts
as a barrier in two ways, "The chief component of these barriers is the
extent of economies of scale in the R&D process. The second major
factor contributing to R&D entry barriers is the accumulation of patents
and know-how on the part of incumbent firms."22
As the new entrants could be risk averters, we expect that the
incentive to enter decreases when risk as measured by the standard
deviation of profit increases. This provides ample justification for the
inclusion of this variable in our specification. In addition to the above
variables an indicator of the level of concentration is also included, as
there exists the possibility of collusion among incumbents to thwart
entry in concentrated industries. This is captured by a dummy with the
value one for highly concentrated industries and zero otherwise23 .  From
19 See Scherer (1970) for further discussions
20 As elaborated in Comanor and Wilson (1967).
21 Bain (1956) notes product differentiation as a significant barrier to entry in
United States manufacturing industries
22 Mueller and Tilton (1969, p.578).
23 Apart from the above-mentioned variables there could be other variables
like factor prices and industry demand elasticities which could have an
influence on entry. As noted by Orr these factors are difficult to quantify
and are not included in the specification.
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the specification we expect that the signs of pip , Q.  and S to be positive
as these variables are expected to provide incentives for entry. Barriers
like K, A, R, r and C are expected to yield negative sign as they hamper
entry.
Given the above specification the task is to justify an appropriate
functional form to estimate the equation 1. This involves several
assumptions. As the barriers have an influence on entry apart the
influence on industry profit rates we substitute equation 2 in equation 1
for arriving pi*. The log form of the dependent variable entry E is used as
we expect the response to a change in the barrier or incentive to be less
in industries with lower entry. Capital requirements are also in log values
as the percent differences rather the absolute differences to be linearly
related to entry.  Thus the relationship between entry and the independent
variable is either by definition in percentage terms or converted into
percentage terms by taken the log values.  So equation 2 can be written as
pi* = α0 + α1logK +α2A +α3R +α4r +α5C (3)
From the above as entry is the difference between  pip and  pi*
equation 1 can be expressed as
E = ß0 e ß1 (pip -pi*) eß2Q. µ1 (4)
Where µ1 is a log normal error term. As entry is correlated with
industry size and A and R are standardized to industry size the
coefficients could be biased. So to test the impact of A and R industry
size an additional variable industry sales (S) is included.  To arrive at the
final estimable equation we multiply equation 4  by S ß3 and  substitute
(3) into (4) and take logs. This yields the following equation, which is
estimated.
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logE = log β0 + β1pip β1α0 - β1α1logK - β1α2 A - β1α3 R - β1α4 r-β1α5 C +
β2Q.+ β3 logS + µ2 (5)
Empirical evidence
The daunting task here is the issue of tracing entry. Entry can
generally be measured in four different ways; (a) by counting the number
of new firms, this expressed as the percentage of the existing stock of
incumbents gives the measure of incidence of entry; (b) by weighing
each entrant by its size relative to the market which gives a measure of
market penetration when summed over all entrants; (c) net entry rates
which are adjusted to exit and finally (d) by considering only those
firms which survive the initial period.  We consider the first measure,
that is, counting the number of new firms, for want of reliable information
like market penetration, exit and survival as consistent data are not
available for these on variables. The procedure followed is outlined
below.
At a macro level a crude picture of entry into the industrial sector
can be understood by examining the variations in the number of non-
government companies limited by shares registered during a period.
This information is available in the annual report on the working and
administration of the Companies Act, 1956, published by the ministry
of law justice and company affairs, Government of India. The report
provides information on the companies at work as well the registration
of new companies during a year apart from additional information on
state wise and industry-wise break-up of companies and liquidation.
Information is provided on Government and non-Government companies
indicating the growth of corporate sector. Industry wise distribution of
the non- Government companies registered during 1995/96 the terminal
year of analysis is provided in table 1.
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Table 1: Non-Govt. Companies by shares registered during 1995/96
Industrial Classification No.of Companies  Percent to Total
Agricultural & Allied  Activities 4055 7.02
Mining & Quarrying 568 1.01
Processing & Manufacturing of
(a) Food Stuffs, Textiles,
Wood Pdts, Leather 4777 8.42
(b) Metals & Chemicals & thereof 10703 19.01
(c) Electricity Gas & Water 295 0.52
Constructions 3239 5.75
Wholesale & Retail Trade &
Restaurants & Hotels 10172 18.06
Transport Storage & Communication 1577 2.80
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
& Business Services 19667 34.92
Community &Personal Services 1295 2.30
Total 56315 100
Source : Dept. of Company Affairs, 40th Annual Report on the Working
&  Administration of the Companies Act 1956, 1996.
As the issue of interest for us is the entry of private sector companies
we limit to non-government companies. It emerges from the above table
that for the year 1995/96 entry, defined as the registration of new
companies, was mainly in the finance, insurance, real estate and business
sector followed by wholesale and retail trade. As these activities do not
come under the purview of manufacturing it does not figure in our
analysis. Within manufacturing we notice entry in metals and chemicals
industries. In order to understand the rate of entry we find the year-to-
year variations in the registration of companies.
It is evident from Table 2 that the growth of newly registered
companies witnessed fluctuations in the nine years considered. We can
discern three distinct phases. In the first phase, which is the three-year
period prior to the launching of economic reforms, entry as defined
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above grew at a rate of around 6.4 percent per annum. This accelerated
soon after the initiation of the reforms after 1991which can be termed as
the second phase. The registration of new companies grew at a rate of
around 25 percent in this phase and in manufacturing activities it grew
in the range of 16 to 20 percent. The relaxing of norms for entry and
other restrictions after 1991 induced further new entry in this phase.
However, the trend reversed in the third phase and the rate of entry
declined drastically in this phase. Compared to the earlier two periods
the aggregate growth of entry becomes negative in this phase. This
however, does not mean there is exit. The growth in the addition of new
firms have fallen pointing to the growth of barriers in this phase. This as
can be seen in the subsequent section is taken up for closer scrutiny.
Another way to infer the behaviour of entry at the aggregate level
is by examining the letters of Intent (LOIs) and Industrial Entrepreneurs
Memorandum (IEMs). These point to the potential entry rather than
actual. The data shown in Table 3 reveals that the growth in number of
LOIs and IEMs filed have fallen sharply in the phase after the initial
years of reform. A comparison with the period prior to 1991 is not possible
as the system of IEM replaced the earlier registration system in 1991.
From the table it clearly emerges that there has been a deceleration in
the LOIs and IEMs filed corroborating the earlier evidence from the
registration of non-Government companies. The available evidence on
entry at the macro level points to a pattern, that is, a period of slow
growth in number of  new entrants prior to the changes in the economic
policy followed by a surge in entry immediately after the launching of
the reforms in 1991 and a deceleration in the growth of new entrants
after the initial three years. This points to the existence of hindrances to
the process of entry even after the changes in economic policy. These
could be market barriers erected by the firms. We try to capture whether
these market barriers have increased or not in the subsequent analysis.
27
Table 2: Growth of newly registered companies
1989/90 1990/911991/92 1992/931993/94 1994/951995/96 1996/971997/98 AVGI AVGII AVGIII
Agriculture & Allied Activities 37.15 -13.47 22.17 40.17 33.79 74.08 72.04 -42.05 -12.85 15.28 49.35 5.71
Mining & Quarrying 25.63 -1.15 6.40 -17.49 -16.89 80.88 25.11 -28.35 -19.41 10.29 15.50 -7.55
Processing and Manufacturing of
   (a) Food stuffs and Textiles -9.31 4.70 1.50 -13.76 35.53 20.55 2.05 -21.39 2.93 -1.04 14.11 -5.47
  (b) Metals, Chemicals & thereof -5.30 -6.67 5.08 -10.60 6.57 31.80 22.32 -11.29 -9.64 -2.30 9.25 0.47
   ©  Electricity, Gas & Steam -12.90 -40.74 53.13 6.12 63.46 124.71 54.45 -16.95 -21.22 -0.17 64.76 5.43
Constructions -9.76 -11.66 12.96 -18.32 16.23 56.98 54.90 -5.28 -17.37 -2.82 18.30 10.75
Wholesale & Retail Trade,
Restaurants & Hotels 1.09 26.64 47.03 3.04 39.07 61.16 -2.30 -31.27 -31.10 24.92 34.42 -21.55
Transport, Storage &
Communications -4.66 -4.73 3.31 27.24 37.28 14.40 26.46 -0.25 7.63 -2.03 26.31 11.28
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate &
Business Services 8.59 11.46 27.46 3.47 7.87 95.20 17.66 -31.08 -35.91 15.84 35.51 -16.44
Community, Social &
Personal Services -17.73 30.33 -3.27 2.58 19.38 65.91 26.71 -14.83 6.80 3.11 29.29 6.23
TOTAL -1.31 3.46 17.09 -2.44 18.72 58.29 17.52 -24.46 -20.26 6.41 24.86 -9.06
Note : AVGI refers to the annual average growth for period I, that is,  1989-90 to 1991-92, AVGII for 1992-93 to 1994-95 and A VGIII
for 1995-96 to 1997-98.
Source: Dept. of Company Affairs, 40th Annual Report on the Working & Administration of the Companies Act 1956, Various issue
28
Table 3: Industrial investment intentions filed through IEMs and LOIs









Growth Rate In period I 17.98 68.84
Growth Rate In Period II -7.88 -20.32
Note:    Annual average growth rates.
Source: Economic survey, various issues.
As is evident from the above the rate of growth of entry has been
declining in the recent years after a period of fast growth soon after
1991. A caveat needs to be added on the above inference. Actual entry
might be even lower than both these pieces of evidence. This is because
registration does not necessarily mean that the firm actually enters the
market. Same is the case with IEMs and LOIs as these are proposals and
not actual investments. Thus these figures might not reflect the true
entry rates. In order to get a magnitude of the actual rate of entry we
examine a sample of firms from the CMIE's electronic database
PROWESS. CMIE provides information on the background of firms24  in
24 This is defined as the background report, which is provided for each firm.
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which both the year of incorporation of the firm as well as the year of
commencement of production is given. We consider the year of
commencement of production as the year of entry as the firm actually
enters the market from that year onwards. Thus from the sample of firms,
by examining the year of commencement of production of each firm, we
trace the number of entrants in each industrial group.
The econometric investigation is done at two stages. First, using
the methodology suggested by Orr (1974) we compute the height of
barriers for the entire set of new firms. This macro analysis is intended to
examine the barriers at an aggregate level for the industrial sector as a
whole. To understand inter-industry variations and identify the
industries, which have increased the barriers, an industry level analysis
is carried out as suggested by Geroski (1991) in the next section.
Before I proceed on to the econometric estimation of equation (5)
a brief description of the data and variables.  As noted earlier the whole
exercise is based on the data drawn from the Prowess.  In Table 4 are
presented the number of new entrants and their distribution across
industrial groups used for the estimation. As the number of entrants
varies from year to year and our further econometric estimation is based
on panel data we consider the entrants for the period 1988 to 1991 as the
entrants for 1991 and 1992 to 1996 for the year 1996.  Correspondingly
the averages of other variables are used for estimations.   Due to the non-
availability of consistent data for the second period the analysis is
restricted to only 202 firms even though the actual number of entrants
are higher in this period.  Average of rates of profit for the industry for
the previous three years is used for past profit rates.  These are actual
profits realized by the firms after taxation as is reported in the balance
sheets. Growth of industrial output for the last three years is used to
capture Q.
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Arriving at capital requirements involves stringent assumptions.
First the minimum effective size (MES) of a firm25  is computed from a
distribution of firms of several class intervals for 1989. This is done by
first identifying the fraction of firms reporting tax losses in the year (t)
and multiplying this by the number of firms in the industry in the year
(f). Then MES is the size of the plant which is (t*f)+1 from the bottom of
the plant size distribution.  The fixed capital of the firms is defined as
the minimum capital required.   Advertising and R&D intensity is defined
as the values of these variables divided by the industry sales. To assess
the extent of risk, the standard deviation of the industry profit for the
previous years are used and to denote whether the industry is highly
concentrated or not a dummy is used.  Inferences regarding concentration
are drawn from the CMIE publication on markets and markets shares.
All variables are collected at the industry level and summed up to arrive
at the figures at the aggregate level.
25  Ideally one should be using the size of the plant. But data constraints do not
permit us to use plant level information
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Table 4:  New entrants according to industrial groups
Industrial Group 1991              1996
Food Products 42 50
Bevearges & Tobacco 3 4
Cotton & Blended textiles 14 11
Textile processing 5 8
Synthetic Yarn 4 2
Inorganic Chemicals 5 3
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals 16 17
Organic Chemicals 8 5
Paints, Varnishes etc. 5 5
Soaps, Detergents etc. 2 3
Tyres & Tubes 3 3
Non-metallic minerals 25 15
Iron & Steel 16 11
Metal products 5 5
Non-Ferrous Metals 5 4
Non-Electrical Machinery 9 6
Electrical Machinery 7 9
Electronics 20 20
Transport Equipment 4 3






Table 5: Determinants of Entry: Econometric Estimates
Note: Estimates of equation (5). t ratios in parenthesis
Results of the estimation of equation (5) are reported in Table 5.
As the intention is to make comparisons over two time points we estimate
the equation for 1991 and 1996. All variables are significant at five
percent level of significance and maintain the expected signs.  From the
above results the following inferences can be made which are consistent
with a priori expectations. Capital requirements, advertising and
concentration are significant barriers to entry and industry size has a
positive impact on entry. Research and development and risk are
moderate barriers to entry in Indian manufacturing and firms are yet to
indulge in erecting barriers on the basis of these. Both past profit rates
and industry growth have positive impact on entry. Thus it can be
concluded that capital requirements, advertising intensity and high
concentration are the strong barriers to entry and research and
development intensity appears to be a moderate barrier considering the
low levels of R&D intensity of the firms.
As our interest here is to compute the height of the overall barriers,
an index of barriers is constructed from the empirically determined


























pip   Q. Log K    A   R    R    C   S  R2
-1.18 0.14 0.18 -0.44 -0.38- -0.18 -0.14 -0.27 0.49
0.51
(-2.23) (2.75) (1.98) (-2.17) (1.99) (-2.77) (-3.21) (-3.65) (2.32)
-1.38 0.20 0.19 -0.85 -0.43 -0.21 -0.16 -0.32 0.55
0.59
(-3.14) (1.99) (2.18) (-4.21) (3.47) (-1.98) (-2.71) (-2.66) (3.67)
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intensity, risk and high concentration to deter entrants ceteris paribus.
An index (I) is constructed simply by weighting the value of each entry
barrier by the regression coefficients estimated, as reported in Table 5.
Higher value of the index indicates higher barriers and vice versa. This
index according to Orr (1974) is insensitive to units of measurement,
continuous and the weight of each individual barrier is empirically
determined26 .
Figure 1 portrays the index thus constructed for the aggregate
sample for two time points 1991 and 1996.
It is evident from the figure that in 1996 the height of overall
market barriers have increased compared to 1991. This, it should be
noted is after the relaxing of the norms of entry and other procedures
pointing to the strategy of firms to erect market barriers based on
advertising, R&D and capital. These did not acquire significance in the
pre-reform era as the firms were already protected under the umbrella of
licenses. The relaxation of the curbs on entry thus on the contrary has















26 See Orr (1974) for properties of this index.
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increased the height of the barriers rather than reducing them. The above
results confirm the low levels of entry in the phase after the economic
reforms (from 1996 onwards) as entry was blocked by the incumbents
by increasing the height of the barriers. The picture will be even clearer
when the analysis is carried at the industry level.
Entry barriers: An industry level examination
Even though the above methodology provides us reasonably good
estimates of the height of the overall barriers to entry it suffers from
inaccuracies introduced by the use of the kinds of variables that proxy
barriers. Moreover, the data available for cross section examination by
itself is capable of inducing biases in the measure. Thus it can only be
considered as a first step in analysing the extent of barriers. Added to
this is the possibility of inter-industry variations in erecting barriers. As
entry is discrete and involves a time lag to respond to incentives, which
differ across industries, a more suitable method will be to examine a
panel of firms across industry groups. In this section we examine the
height of entry barriers using a panel of firms at the individual industry
level. For the task in hand a more appropriate methodology is that of
Geroski (1991) as it suits the panel data analysis and minimizes the
inaccuracies in measurements.
Geroski (1991) modifies the basic empirical model of Orr. It is as
follows. Consider entry as an 'error correction mechanism' which is
attracted by excess profits. Entry in this sense will occur whenever profits
differ from their long run levels. With the above hypothesis, observations
of actual entry rates and current profits can be used to make inferences
about the unobservable - the long run profits.  Entry Ejt in an industry j
at time t is hypothesized to occur whenever expected post entry profits
piejt exceed level of profits protected in the long run by entry barriers bj,
that is,
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µpiγ jtjeijt  + )b - ( = E jt 1
The level of profits that can be sustained in perpetuity without
attracting entry is clearly bj and these  "limit profits" are a natural measure
of the height of barriers to entry. In other words the flow of entry that
would have occurred if there were no entry barriers is γpiejt and the
difference between this and the actual flow Ejt is on average equal to
γbj, which clearly depends on the height of barriers to entry.
To discuss the micro economic foundations of equation (1) more
explicitly. Suppose that a firm i chooses output xi and that industry
output is x ≡ Σxi.  Assume that the output is homogenous and the demand
be  p = p(x) and the marginal costs be constant at a level of ci per unit.
Thus the current period profits net of fixed cost are
]c - [p(x)x = iiipi 2
The choice of xi by firm i in period t is affected by two constraints.
First, rivals are likely to respond to any attempt by i to expand and this
response is likely to occur over time. Using conjectural variations we
suppose that firm i expects an initial aggregate response,
dxi/dxit ≡  θ0 by all rivals and a subsequent response
dxt+1/dxit ≡ θ1 to any output change that it makes in
period t.
Since  dx/dxi = (1 + Σdxj/dxi), j ≠ i then θ0 = θ1 = 0 describes a
situation in which price is expected to remain constant when xi changes.
Thus the larger are θ0 and θ1 the less accommodating are rivals and so is
the price decline consequent on increasing xi.
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Second the choice of xi in t may involve firm i  substantial short
run adjustment costs if xit ≠ xit-127
These adjustment cost Ajt = A(xit,xit-1) are assumed for the sake of
simplicity to be proportional to increase in market share  implied by the
choice of xit given xit-1. That is if
Sit ≡ xit/xt then marginal costs are assumed to be dAit/dxit ≡ dt(Sit -
Sit-1). Finally we assume that  dt/pt ≡ δ which is constant over time.
Given these assumptions choice in t by firm i have future effect
and a rational decision maker will maximize the expected present








Where p is the discount factor, Et(.) denotes the expectation at
time t of the quantity in parenthesis. We have suppressed subscript i to
simplify the notation.
The sequence of xit which maximizes (3) satisfies 28
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Rearranging and simplifying (4) gives
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27 Penrose discusses this type of costs like managerial costs.
28 See Sargent (1979) for details.
=  0
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Where Et(St+1) ≡ Se(t+1) ,  λ ≡ ρPt/P(t+1) and is assumed to be constant
and η is the elasticity of demand (η < 0). Collecting terms and suppressing
τ, we obtain
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Under reasonable restrictions on the parameters the solution to
(6) is
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Where η1  and η2 are such that 0 < η1<1/γ1<η2 .
They are the roots of (6) and so are implicitly defined by the two
equations η1 + η2 = - γ2/γ1, and η1η2 = 1/γ1












We can write (7)  as
)S - S)( - (1 = S 1-t*t1t η∆ 9
Whether written as (6), (7) or (9) the model has reasonable
interpretation. Two observations help to bring this out. First if q1 = d =










which is standard Cowling-Waterson model of market structure and
price-cost margins. Eq 5 then says that a firm choosing St   given St > St-
1 and expecting S t+1> St will earn less than - θ0 St/ η, i.e., an expansion
programme generate short run costs of adjustment.
Secondly equation 9 is a way of relating the model to the standard
dynamic models used in applied work. If S*t = S* then Eq 9 describes a
partial adjustment to a fixed target. In practice the target S* will not be
constant over time and equation 8 makes plain not only that it does
depend on the entire future stream of profit but also that it is a target
which depends on the expectation of these profits. It is therefore likely
to be a moving target, being updated continuously with the arrival of
new information. When the adjustment costs are high then adjustment
is slower and even slower when there are adverse price consequences of
rivals' reactions.
For an entrant in its year of entry St-1 = 0, then Eq.9 simplifies to
S)-(1 = E *t1t η 11
Et = entrant's market penetration.
From equation 11 it is clear that entry will occur if the appropriately
discounted present value of stream of expected post entry margins is
positive and that entrants will respond more quickly to t given S*t. The
more benign the response of incumbents the smaller are adjustment
costs. But this is an incomplete model of entry due to two problems.
Firstly, entrants may have to pay a fixed entry cost (F) to enter and
secondly, the level of cost ci that the entrant i incurs in producing output
xi is not observable. The observable variable is the price-cost margin of
t st
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the incumbents. Entry costs imply that marginal cost does not equal to
average cost and absolute cost disadvantages imply that incumbents
and entrants operate along different marginal cost schedules. With fixed
costs what is germane are price average cost margins. Thus if (p-ai)/p  is





a - p E11 12
The difference between average unit costs between entrant and
incumbent depend on both F and the difference in MC between them.
)-(1 )/p,a- a(b )/p,a-(p  Writing 11E1 ηγpi ≡≡≡
We can write EQ 10 entirely in terms of observable as
)b - ( = E ie itit piγ 13
Equation 1 is the basic empirical model of entry. Equation 2 to 12
provides interpretation of γ, pie and b. The speed of response γ of entrants
to excess profits depends upon the elasticity of demand, cost of
adjustment and no future reaction by incumbents to current entry. When
there are future reactions to entry and the adjustment costs are high then
rational entrants will respond to more than just current profits. In the
long run however entry barriers may leave entrants permanently
disadvantaged, facing higher unit costs than those faced by the
incumbents. This is captured by b.
Specifying an empirical entry equation
To turn equation 1 into a regression equation to measure γ and the
height of entry barriers we need to express in terms of observables. The
problem is that neither piejt nor bj is directly observable. One is
expectational variable and the other unobserved outcomes. The usual
procedure is to assume that entrants use lagged actual profits pijt-1 to
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proxy expected post entry profits and to model bj as being determined
by a series of observable features of current market structure.
X +  = b j10j ββ 14
For the ease of exposition we have assumed that only one
observable measure of entry barriers Xj is used. These two assumptions
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Neglecting purely random transitory factors, Ejt=0 in the long run











If the entrants expect no higher profits than pi*j, then they will not
be able to cover their entry costs, so will not enjoy a positive return post
entry.
There are three conceptual problems, which make equations 15 a
little tentative. Firstly, the use of observed profits prior to entry pijt-1 to
predict expected post entry profits piejt presumes that entrants have naive
expectations. In assuming that outcomes will be the same post entry as
they were pre-entry, naive entrants neglect the effect that their entry will
have on profits. But it is hard to accept the proposition that entrants will
be naive. As the expectations that any but the most naive entrants are
likely to hold are unlikely to be based on pre-entry observables, we
should mimic the kind of expectations formation process that entrants
might use if we are to proxy piejt properly. The second problem is that it
is often difficult to obtain good cross section estimates of particular
types of barriers to entry. For example it is difficult to construct a variable
that reflects the strategic control of incumbents on scarce natural resource.
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So it is prudent to regard Xj as being measured with error, more over,
there is a possibility that certain types of barriers are likely to be omitted
from most of the regression equations. Thus the estimates could be
inefficient estimates. Thirdly, the equation assumes that entrants respond
at the same speed to profit opportunities in all the industries, which is
usually made purely for the convenience of estimation. But the basic
model we have constructed is shaped by the decisions we have made
with respect to each of the three points.  So we dwell with these three
issues separately.
First, piejt is the level of profit expected by the entrant post entry
which is not observable prior. However an entrant who forms rational
expectations will make use of all the information available to it at the
time it make the decisions. This information comes in two forms (1)
observed data reflecting past market outcomes and (2) a prior knowledge
of how market processes operate. The two types of information
complement each other because knowledge of market operations enables
the entrant to establish a causal link between the different observables
in its information set. So we combine the two types of information in a
simple econometric model which enables the entrant to predict profits.
Given the observed data on profits pijt-1 and other variables Zj we
can model the interaction between entry and profitability by expressing
each as a distributed lag function of the other plus exogenous variables.
Solving the model by eliminating the entry variables yields an auto
regression in profits
εpiλpi jtjt1-jtjt  + Z + (L) = Φ  17
Where λ(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L. The assumption
of rational expectations implies that expectations are unbiased and will
differ from realized values only randomly.
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We can use the predictions from equation 17 in place of
unobservable latent variable piejt if entrants' expectations are rational.
Doing this insures that the information available to entrant in t-1 will be
used to make predictions of pijt and this in turn implies that Ejt will be a
regression error with classical properties. We shall assume that entrants
make their decisions rationally, using the predicted value of pijt to proxy
the latent variable piejt to model the signal that attracts entry29.  Measuring
entry barriers poses the second problem. The solution of this problem is
the observation that height of barriers to entry ought to be fixed in the
short to medium run in most of the industries. They take specific value
in each industry. As a practical matter then, we can measure the height of
barriers to entry as
bj = ßj + ß1Xj  18
where the fixed effects  ßj  are objects of estimation along with ß1
and Xj is an observable determinant of barriers. Substituting equation
18 in equation 1 generates an equation like 15 the difference being that
a0 takes different value for each industry. The amended model becomes
an equation with fixed effects and cannot be estimated using single
cross section data. It can only be estimated using panel data. The third
conceptual problem is the assumption that g the speed of response by
entrants is the same in all industries. Although we wish to model the
determinants of variations in the response rates of entrants, our data are
too limited to do this job.
To sum up, we propose estimation of equation 15 using a rational
expectations estimator for piejt. As the model includes fixed effect to
capture unobserved entry barriers we wish to work with two years of
29 See Wallis (1980) and Wickens (1982) for the standard procedure to estimate
rational expectation models and Pagan (1984, 1986) on the properties of
two stage estimators.
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data. Two separate panels are estimated to compare barriers overtime the
first panel uses data for 1991 and 1992 and the second one for 1996 and
1997. The observable variables are industry size and industry growth.
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First step in the estimation of equation (19) is to generate proxy
values for piejt. The estimates of the reduced form estimates of equation
(17) used to generate the proxy values are given below.
pit = -0.31pit-1 - 0.12pit-2 - 0.002pit-3 - 0.04 SIZEt-1 + 0.01GROWt-1 - 0.002 EXPt-1
(-3.21)  (-2.34)   (-1.03)     (-2.84)      (2.11)     (-1.24)
R2 = 0.92
pit = -0.28pit-1 - 0.14pit-2 - 0.003pit-3 - 0.02 SIZEt-1 + 0.01GROWt-1 - 0.001 EXPt-1
(-3.37)     (-3.11)    (-.96)     (-2.41)      (2.02)      (-0.87)
R2 = 0.89
The first set of estimates corresponds to the panel for 1991 and
1992 and the second set of estimates for 1996 and 1997. EXP denotes
export intensity and t statistics are denoted in the parenthesis. The high
explanatory power of the models is due to the inclusion of the lagged
profits as explanatory variables. This points to the fact that current
profits are affected to a great extent by the past profits while export
intensity does not seem to affect the observed current profits. Another
notable feature is that there exists significant fixed effects and that the
between variations in the data dominates the within variations. This
also implies that the differences in profit margins between industries are
larger than the margins within an industrial group.
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Having generated the proxy values for expected profits we estimate
equation (19) along with the fixed effects and results are reported in Table 6.
Table 6: Regressions explaining entry





GROW t-1 -0.13 -0.19
(-1.36) (-1.07)
R2 0.46 0.41
Note: Panel I refers to 1991,1992 and panel II refers to 1996,1997.
t statistics are given in the parenthesis. piejt  expected profits measured
as the predicted value from pijt  from equation (17). Sizet-1 is the lagged
log of total output and GROW t-1 is the lagged rate of growth of output.
Ejt is the gross entry.
From the table it follows that 10 percent rise in expected profits
increase entry by around 1.5 percent during 1991 and 1992 while the
increase in entry falls below one percent for 1996 and 1997. It can also
be observed that entry exhibits variations with excess profits and
variations in industry size and growth rates appears to have little effect
on the barriers and thus on the entry flows. Using the estimated parameters
and equation (16) we solve for the level of profits which can be sustained
without attracting entry, that is the limit profits, which are a measure of
the height of barriers to entry. As the fixed effects could not be reduced
to a sample wide constant there exists substantial inter-industry variations
in the height of barriers. On an average the height of barriers in 1991 was
around 35 percent and this increased to around 40 percent by 1996.
This means that firms could maintain prices above 35 percent of costs
without attracting entry in1991 and in the 1996 they could maintain
















































































Figures 2 to 5 makes this point more explicit. It can be noticed
that in all the industries there has been an increase in the height of
overall barrier. Barriers are the highest in synthetic textiles and transport
equipment and parts followed by iron and steel products, tyres and
tubes and non-ferrous metals and soaps, detergents and cosmetics. Food
and food products, leather and leather products and textile products
register the lowest barriers. On the whole we observe an increase in
barriers in all the industrial groups in 1996 compared to 1991 confirming
the results at the aggregate level.
To sum up
In this paper an analysis of the extent of barriers for new entrants
in the manufacturing sector has been attempted. As the thrust of the
economic policy changes have been on the easing and removal of
restrictions in the industrial sector the analysis has been for the period
since the onset of the changes in the policies. As a prelude to the analysis
the extent of entry is traced.  The number of new entrants measured as
the gross entry grew at the steady rate in the pre-reform period, accelerated
immediately after the reforms and register a declining trend during the
last three years. This points to the existence of hindrances even after the
removal  of institutionalised barriers like licenses. These hindrances are
the non-institutionalised market barriers like advertising. The extent of
market barriers has been captured by examining the height of these
barriers.
Econometric estimation of the height of the barriers for 1991 and
1996 yield that the height of barriers has increased in 1996 at the
aggregate level.  An examination at the disaggregate level reveals that
in almost all the industries examined from a sample of firms drawn from
the CMIE the height of the barriers have increased in 1997 compared to
1991. Ever since the doing away of the 'license raj', firms have been able
48
to indulge in entry blocking strategies fuelled by the working of market
forces.  The dilution and dismantling of commands and controls intended
to ease entry have thus paved the way for the erection and strengthening
of market barriers which have grown over time.
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Institutional regulations by way of licensing and capacity
restrictions have often been considered as barriers to competition in
Indian industry.  As most of these regulations have given way for market
signals an increase in the number of entrants and alterations in the
conditions of entry, mainly the barriers to entry are expected.  In this
paper I attempt to analyse the extent of barriers to entry in Indian
manufacturing by empirically quantifying the height of these barriers.
Econometric estimation of the height of the barriers for 1991 and 1996
shows that the height of barriers increased in 1996 at the aggregate
level.  An examination at the disaggregate level reveals that in almost
all the industries examined from a sample of firms drawn from the CMIE
the height of the barriers have increased in 1996 compared to 1991.  The
dilution and dismantling of commands and controls intended to ease
entry have thus paved the way for the erection and strengthening of
market barriers which have grown over time.
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